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ABSTRACT
While the traditional view of financial innovation emphasizes the risk sharing role of new financial
assets, belief disagreements about these assets naturally lead to speculation, which represents a powerful
economic force in the opposite direction. This paper investigates the effect of financial innovation
on portfolio risks in an economy when both the risk sharing and the speculation forces are present.
I consider this question in a standard mean-variance framework. Financial assets provide hedging
services but they are also subject to speculation because traders do not necessarily agree about their
payoffs. I define the average variance of traders' net worths as a measure of portfolio risks for this
economy, and I decompose it into two components: the uninsurable variance, defined as the average
variance that would obtain if there were no belief disagreements, and the speculative variance, defined
as the residual variance that results from speculative trades based on belief disagreements. Financial
innovation always decreases the uninsurable variance because new assets increase the possibilities
for risk sharing. My main result shows that financial innovation also always increases the speculative
variance. This is true even if traders completely agree about the payoffs of new assets. The intuition
behind this result is the hedge-more/bet-more effect: Traders use new assets to hedge their bets on
existing assets, which in turn enables them to place larger bets and take on greater risks.
The net effect of financial innovation on portfolio risks depends on the quantitative strength of its
effects on the uninsurable and the speculative variances. I consider a calibration of the model for new
assets linked to national incomes of G7 countries, which were recommended by Athanasoulis and
Shiller (2001) to facilitate risk sharing. For reasonable levels of belief disagreements, these assets
would actually increase the average consumption risks of individuals in G7 countries. In addition,
a profit seeking market maker would introduce a different subset of these assets than the ones proposed
by Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001). The endogenous set of new assets would be directed towards increasing
the opportunities for speculation rather than risk sharing.
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1 Introduction
According to the traditional view of nancial innovation, new nancial assets facilitate the
diversication and the sharing of risks.1 However, this view does not take into account that
new assets are often associated with much uncertainty, especially because they do not have a
long track record. Belief disagreements come as a natural by-product of this uncertainty and
change the implications of risk taking in these markets. In particular, market participants
disagreements about how to value new assets naturally lead to speculation, which represents
a powerful economic force that tends to increase risks.
An example is o¤ered by the recent crisis. Assets backed by pools of subprime mortgages
(e.g., subprime CDOs) became highly popular in the run-up to the crisis. One role of these
assets is to allocate the risks to market participants who are best able to bear them. The
safer tranches are held by investors that are looking for safety (or liquidity), while the riskier
tranches are held by nancial institutions who are willing to hold these risks at some price.
While these assets (and their CDSs) should have served a stabilizing role in theory, they became
a major trigger of the crisis in practice, when a fraction of nancial institutions realized losses
from their positions. Importantly, the same set of assets also generated considerable prots for
some market participants,2 which suggests that at least some of the trades on these assets were
speculative. What becomes of the risk sharing role of new assets when market participants use
them to speculate on their di¤erent views?
To address this question, this paper analyzes the e¤ect of nancial innovation on portfolio
risks in a model that features both the risk sharing and the speculation motives for trade.
Traders with income risks take positions in a set of nancial assets, which enables them to share
and diversify some of their background risks. However, traders have belief disagreements about
asset payo¤s, which induces them to take also speculative positions on assets. I assume traders
have mean-variance preferences over net worth. In this setting, a natural measure of portfolio
risk for a trader is the variance of her net worth (calculated according to her own beliefs).
I dene the average variance as an average of this risk measure across all traders. I further
decompose the average variance into two components: the uninsurable variance, dened as the
variance that would obtain if there were no belief disagreements, and the speculative variance,
dened as the residual amount of variance that results from speculative trades based on belief
disagreements. I model nancial innovation as an expansion of the set of assets available for
trade. My main result characterizes the e¤ect of nancial innovation on each component of the
average variance. In line with the traditional view, nancial innovation always decreases the
uninsurable variance because new assets increase the possibilities for risk sharing. Theorem
1 shows that nancial innovation also always increases the speculative variance. Moreover,
1Cochrane (2001) summarizes this view as follows: Better risk sharing is much of the force behind nancial
innovation. Many successful new securities can be understood as devices to more widely share risks.
2Lewis (2010) provides a detailed description of investors that took a short position on housing related assets
in the run-up to the recent crisis.
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there exist economies in which this increase in the speculative variance is su¢ ciently strong
that nancial innovation increases the average variance (by an arbitrary amount). This result
formalizes the sense in which nancial innovation can increase portfolio risks.
My analysis identies two main channels by which nancial innovation increases the spec-
ulative variance. First, new assets lead to new disagreements because they are associated with
new uncertainties. Second, and perhaps more importantly, new assets also amplify specula-
tion on existing disagreements. To illustrate the second channel, Theorem 1 shows that new
assets increase the speculative variance even if traders completely agree about their payo¤s.
This result is somewhat surprising because traders use new assets to hedge some of the spec-
ulative risks they have been undertaking from their bets on existing assets. In view of this
direct hedging e¤ect, one could expect new assets (on which there is complete agreement) to
reduce the speculative variance. This view does not take into account a powerful amplication
mechanism, the hedge-more/bet-more e¤ect.
To illustrate this e¤ect, consider the following example. Suppose two traders have di¤ering
views about the Swiss Franc, which is highly correlated with the Euro. The optimist believes
the Franc will appreciate while the pessimist believes it will depreciate. Traders do not disagree
about the Euro, perhaps because they disagree about the prospects of the Swiss economy but
not about the Euro zone. First suppose traders can only take positions on the Franc and
not the Euro. In this case, traderspositions in the Franc will be determined by a standard
risk-return trade-o¤. Traders may not take too large positions on the Franc especially because
the Franc is a¤ected by multiple sources of risks, e.g., the shocks that a¤ect the Swiss economy
as well as the shocks to the Euro zone. To bet on their belief di¤erences, traders must bear
all of these risks, which might make them reluctant to take large positions. Suppose instead
the Euro is also introduced for trade (which can be interpreted as nancial innovation in
this example). In this case, traders will complement their positions in the Franc by taking the
opposite positions in the Euro. This is because the complementary positions enable traders to
hedge the risks that also a¤ect the Euro, which they dont disagree about, and to take purer
bets on the Franc. With purer bets, traders bear less risk for each unit position on the Franc,
which in turn enables them to take larger positions. Put di¤erently, when traders are able
to hedge more, they are induced to bet more. Theorem 1 shows that the hedge-more/bet-
more e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong that the introduction of the Euro in this example (and more
generally, a new asset) increases the speculative variance.
My main result, Theorem 1, takes the new assets as exogenous and analyzes their impact
on portfolio risks. In practice, new nancial assets are endogenously introduced by economic
agents with prot incentives. A sizeable literature emphasizes risk sharing as a major driving
force in endogenous nancial innovation [see, for example, Allen and Gale (1994) or Du¢ e
and Rahi (1995)]. A natural question is to what extent the risk sharing motive for nancial
innovation is robust to the presence of belief disagreements. I address this question by in-
troducing a prot seeking market maker that innovates new assets for which it subsequently
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serves as the intermediary. The market makers expected prots are proportional to traders
perceived surplus from trading new assets. Thus, tradersspeculative trading motive, as well
as their risk sharing motive, creates innovation incentives for the market maker. In particular,
the optimal asset design (characterized in Theorem 2) depends on the size and the nature of
belief disagreements, in addition to the risk sharing possibilities. When traders have common
beliefs, the market maker innovates assets that minimize the average variance, as in Demange
and Laroque (1995) and Athanasoulis and Shiller (2000). In contrast to these traditional re-
sults, Theorem 3 also characterizes the polar opposite case: When tradersbelief disagreements
are su¢ ciently large, the market maker innovates assets which maximize the average variance
among all possible choices, completely disregarding the risk sharing motive for nancial inno-
vation.
These results show that belief disagreements, when they are su¢ ciently large, change the
nature of nancial innovation as well as its e¤ect on portfolio risks. A natural question is
how large belief disagreements must be to make these results practically relevant. To address
this question, I consider a calibration of the model in the context of the national income
markets proposed by Shiller (1993), and analyzed in detail by Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001).
Assets whose payo¤s are linked to (various combinations of) national incomes could in principle
facilitate the sharing of income risks among di¤erent countries. Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001)
characterize the optimal design of such assets. They also calibrate their model for G7 countries,
and argue that the innovation of a couple of these assets would lead to large welfare gains in view
of the reduction in individualsconsumption risks. I consider the e¤ect of belief disagreements
on their results about consumption risks. Using exactly their data and calibration, I nd that
reasonable amounts of belief disagreements imply that the new assets proposed by Athanasoulis
and Shiller (2001) would actually increase the average consumption variance of individuals in
G7 countries.
To illustrate this result, consider the following as a measure of belief disagreements on a
random variable, X:
X =
cross-sectional standard deviation of (prior) beliefs for the mean of X
standard deviation of X
.
The measure, X (which is independent of linear transformations of X), captures how dis-
persed individuals prior beliefs are relative to the volatility of X. I show that if  on the
yearly per-capita income growth of a G7 country is at least 2%, then the new assets pro-
posed by Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001) increase individualsaverage consumption variance.
Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001) estimate the standard deviation of yearly per-capita income
growth to be 2:46% for G7 countries over the years they consider. Given this estimate, my
result holds if two randomly chosen individualsbeliefs for the mean of the per-capita income
growth of a G7 country di¤er on average by about 0:05%. Disagreements at this order of
magnitude do not seem unreasonable. According to the Philadelphia Feds Survey of Profes-
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sional Forecasters, the interquartile range of forecastersbeliefs for the US yearly GDP growth
averaged 0:70% between 1992 and 2011. Over the same period, the standard deviation of the
US yearly GDP growth has been 2:08%. This suggests  = 25%, which is an order of magni-
tude larger than necessary to overturn the risk sharing implications of Athanasoulis and Shiller
(2001).
The intuition for the calibration result comes from the fact that the per-capita income risks
in developed countries is small relative to their per-capita incomes. Moreover, income risks are
correlated across developed countries. Thus, even if these risks are perfectly diversied, the
reduction in the standard deviation of consumption amounts to a relatively small fraction of
income. According to Athanasoulis and Shillers (2001) estimates, completing the international
risk sharing markets reduces the standard deviation of per-capita consumption growth in a G7
country from 2:46% to 2:13%. In terms of my variance decomposition, this implies that the
reduction in uninsurable risks is small relative to average income. In contrast, with a typical
calibration for the relative risk aversion parameter, relative = 3, individuals are willing to
risk a greater fraction of their incomes in their pursuit for speculative gains. In particular,
belief disagreements at the order of  = 2% are su¢ cient to ensure that the increase in the
speculative variance dominates the relatively small decrease in uninsurable variance.
This calibration result concerns the new assets which were characterized by Athanasoulis
and Shiller (2001) to be socially optimal absent belief disagreements. When there are no
belief disagreements, these are the same assets that would be endogenously designed by a
prot seeking market maker (characterized in Theorem 2). However, belief disagreements also
change the nature of nancial innovation in this setting. When  = 2% and relative = 3, the
endogenous asset design is typically very di¤erent than in Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001),
because new assets are directed towards increasing the opportunities for speculation rather
than risk sharing. This result suggests that the speculation motive for nancial innovation is
likely to be important in practice.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next subsection discusses the related
literature. Section 2 introduces the basic environment. This section also uses simple examples
to illustrate the two channels by which new assets increase tradersportfolio risks. Section
3 completes the description of the environment and characterizes the equilibrium. Section
4 denes the average variance and decomposes it into the uninsurable and the speculative
components. Section 5 presents the main result, which characterizes the e¤ect of nancial
innovation on the two components of the average variance. Section 6 analyzes endogenous
nancial innovation. Section 7 generalizes the earlier results to the case in which the average
variance is dened using an empirical distribution (as opposed to traderssubjective beliefs).
Section 8 presents the calibration results and Section 9 concludes. Appendix A contains proofs
that are omitted from the main text.
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1.1 Related Literature
My paper is related to a sizeable literature on nancial innovation and security design [see, in
addition to the above mentioned papers, Van Horne (1985), Miller (1986), Ross (1988), Merton
(1989, 1992), Du¢ e and Jackson (1989), Cuny (1993), Tufano (2003)]. To my knowledge, this
literature has not explored the implications of heterogenous beliefs for security design. For
example, in their survey of the literature, Du¢ e and Rahi (1994) note that one theme of the
literature, going back at least to Working (1953) and evident in the Milgrom and Stokey (1982)
no-trade theorem, is that an exchange would rarely nd it attractive to introduce a security
whose sole justication is the opportunity for speculation. The results of this paper show
that this observation does not apply if traders have heterogeneous prior beliefs rather than
heterogeneous information. The observation also does not apply if traders have heterogeneous
information but security prices do not reveal information fully due to the presence of noise
traders. The analogues of my results can be derived for this alternative setting. The important
economic ingredient is that traders continue to have some disagreements after observing asset
prices. In addition, the quantitative results of this paper suggest that a relatively small amount
of belief disagreements of this type is su¢ cient to ensure that speculation is a signicant factor
in nancial innovation.
Another strand of the literature has analyzed the implications of belief disagreements for
asset prices or volume of trade. A very incomplete list includes Miller (1977), Harrison and
Kreps (1978), Varian (1985, 1989), Harris and Raviv (1993), Kandel and Pearson (1995),
Zapatero (1998), Chen, Hong and Stein (2003), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Geanakoplos
(2009), Cao (2010), Simsek (2011). The main di¤erence of my paper from this literature is the
focus on the e¤ect of belief disagreements on the riskiness of traders portfolios, rather than
the riskiness (and the level) of prices or the volume of trade.
My paper also contributes to a literature that analyzes the role of nancial innovation in
generating nancial instability. Rajan (2005) and Calomiris (2008) emphasize the e¤ect of
nancial innovation on agency problems. Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2010) investigate the
neglected risks associated with new nancial assets. My paper identies the increase in traders
speculative variance as an additional channel through which nancial innovation decreases
nancial stability. A related paper by Stein (1987) shows that speculation driven by nancial
innovation can reduce welfare through informational externalities. My paper di¤ers from Stein
(1987) by modeling speculation with heterogeneous prior beliefs rather than heterogeneous
information. With this approach, I show that nancial innovation increases the speculative
variance of tradersnet worths even without informational externalities. However, unlike Stein
(1987), I do not make any welfare statements since the welfare analysis with heterogeneous
prior beliefs raises some unresolved theoretical issues, which I discuss further in the concluding
Section 9. The idea that speculation may create nancial instability appears also in Stiglitz
(1989), Summers and Summers (1991), and Stout (1995). However, these analyses are mostly
informal and they do not derive any results similar to my theorems.
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In related work, Brock, Hommes, and Wagener (2009) identify another source of instability
brought about by nancial innovation and the hedge-more/bet-more e¤ect. Their main ingre-
dient is reinforcement learning: That is, they assume traders choose their beliefs according
to a tness measure, such as past prots made by the belief. This ingredient implies that
the steady-state corresponding to the fundamental asset price can be dynamically unstable.
Brock et al. (2009) show that the introduction of new assets increases the range of parameters
for which the steady-state is unstable. In view of the hedge-more/bet-more e¤ect, new assets
enable traders to take greater positions on their beliefs. Consequently, a belief that turns out
to be correct yields a greater prot, and it is chosen by a greater number of traders in the
next period. This in turn makes the steady-state more likely to be dynamically unstable. In
contrast to this paper, I take tradersprior beliefs as given and I show that nancial innova-
tion increases the speculative variance of tradersnet worths regardless of how those beliefs
are formed. In particular, my results do not require the reinforcement learning ingredient.
2 Basic Environment and Main Channels
Consider an economy with two dates, f0; 1g, and a single consumption good (dollar). There
are a nite number of traders denoted by i 2 I = f1; 2; ::; jIjg. Each trader is endowed with e
dollars at date 0, which is constant. Trader i is also endowed with wi dollars at date 1, which
is a random variable that captures the traders background risks. Traders only consume at
date 1, and they can transfer resources to date 1 by investing in one of two ways. They can
invest in cash which yields one dollar for each dollar invested. Alternatively, they can invest
in risky assets denoted by j 2 J = f1; ::; jJ jg. Asset j is in xed supply, normalized to zero,
and it pays aj dollars at date 1, which is a random variable. At date 0, the asset is traded in a
competitive market at price pj . Assetspayo¤s and prices are respectively denoted by column
vectors a =
 
a1; ::; ajJ j
0
and p =
 
p1; ::; pjJ j
0
. This vector notation will be used throughout
the paper.
Trader is position in asset j is denoted by xji 2 R. Given the price vector p, the trader
chooses an asset portfolio, xi, and invests the rest of her budget, e  x0ip 2 R, in cash.3 With
these investment decisions, her net worth at date 1 is given by:
ni = e  x0ip+ wi + x0ia.
Trader is preferences are captured by a CARA utility function over net worth at date 1. In
particular, she chooses her portfolio to maximize:
Ei [  exp ( ini)] ,
3Note that traders are allowed to take unrestricted negative positions in risky assets or cash, that is, both short
selling and leverage are allowed. Similarly, the asset payo¤s can take negative values because the environment
is frictionless. In particular, there is no limited liability and repayment is enforced by contracts.
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where i denotes her coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. I make assumptions below which
ensure that the asset payo¤s,

aj
	
j
, and the traders income shock, wi, are jointly Normally
distributed according to the traders beliefs. In view of this Normality assumption and CARA
preferences, the traders optimization reduces to the usual mean-variance problem:
max
xi
Ei [ni]  i
2
vari [ni] . (1)
Here, Ei [] denotes the mean and vari [] denotes the variance according to trader is beliefs.
Remark 1. The only role of the CARA preferences and the Normality assumption is to gen-
erate the mean-variance optimization in (1). In particular, the results of this paper apply as
long as tradersportfolio choice can be reduced to the form in (1) over net worth. An impor-
tant special case is the continuous-time model in which traders have time-separable expected
utility preferences (which are not necessarily CARA), and asset returns and background risks
follow di¤usion processes. In this case, the optimization problem of a trader at any date can
be reduced to the form in (1) (see Ingersoll, 1987). The only caveat is that the reduced form
coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion, i, is endogenous since it depends on the traders value
function. Thus, in the continuous trading environment, the results of this paper apply at a
trading date conditional on traderscoe¢ cients of absolute risk aversion, figi.
The equilibrium in this economy is a collection of asset prices, p, and portfolios,
 
x1; ::;xjIj

,
such that each trader i chooses her portfolio to solve problem (1) and prices clear asset markets,
that is, X
i
xji = 0 for each j 2 J .
I will capture nancial innovation in this economy as an expansion of the set of traded assets,
J . The main goal of this paper is to characterize the e¤ects of nancial innovation on portfolio
risks. Before I turn to the general characterization, I use two simple examples to illustrate
respectively the two channels by which nancial innovation increases portfolio risks.
Example 1: New assets generate new disagreements
This example illustrates that new assets generate speculation when traders disagree about
their payo¤s. Moreover, this speculation can be su¢ ciently strong that nancial innovation
increases tradersportfolio risks despite the fact that new assets also provide their traditional
risk sharing benets.
Suppose there are two traders with the same coe¢ cient of risk aversion, i.e., I = f1; 2g and
1 = 2  . Tradersdate 1 endowments are perfectly negatively correlated. In particular,
let v  N (0; 1) denote a standard normal random variable and suppose:
w1 = v and w2   v.
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First consider the case in which there are no assets, i.e., J = ;. In this case, tradersdate 1
net worths are given by
n1 = e+ v and n2 = e  v. (2)
Tradersnet worths are risky because they are unable to hedge their endowment risks.
Next suppose a new asset is introduced with payo¤:
a1 = v.
Suppose traders have common beliefs about the asset payo¤, given by N (0; 1). In this case,
tradersequilibrium portfolios are given by:
x11 =  1 and x12 = 1
(and the equilibrium price is p1 = 0). Tradersnet worths are constant and given by
n1 = n2 = e:
With common beliefs, nancial innovation enables traders to hedge and diversify their idio-
syncratic risks.
Next suppose traders have heterogeneous prior beliefs for the payo¤ of the new asset.
In particular, trader 1s prior belief for the random variable v is denoted by N ("; 1), while
trader 2s prior belief is N ( "; 1), for some " > 0. The parameter " captures the level of
belief disagreements. Note that trader 1 is optimistic about the asset payo¤ while trader 2 is
pessimistic. Their equilibrium portfolios can be calculated as:
x11 =  1 +
"

and x12 = 1 
"

.
In this case, traderspositions are inuenced by their belief di¤erences as well as their hedging
demands. Tradersnet worths are given by:
n1 = e+
"

v and n2 = e  "

v.
If " > , then traders net worths are even riskier than the case in which no new asset is
introduced [cf. Eq. (2)]. With these beliefs, trader 1 is so optimistic about the assets payo¤
that she takes a positive position, despite the fact that her endowment is positively correlated
with the asset payo¤. Consequently, the new asset increases the riskiness of her net worth.
Hence, when tradersdisagreements about new assets are su¢ ciently large, nancial innovation
increases tradersportfolio risks.
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Example 2: New assets amplify speculation on existing disagreements
This example illustrates that nancial innovation increases portfolio risks through a second
channel: By amplifying tradersspeculation on existing disagreements. In view of this channel,
new assets increase portfolio risks even if traders completely agree about their payo¤s.
As in Example 1, suppose there are two traders with the same coe¢ cient of risk aversion,
i.e., I = f1; 2g and 1 = 2  . But this time suppose traders date 1 endowments are
constant, w1 = w2 = 0, which ensures that there is no risk sharing motive for trade. Suppose
also that the fundamental risk in this economy is captured by 2 random variables, v1; v2, which
are i.i.d. with standard Normal distribution, N (0; 1). Traders have common beliefs for v2
given by the distribution, N (0; 1). However, they disagree about v1. In particular, trader 1s
belief for v1 is given by N ("; 1) while trader 2s belief is given by N ( "; 1).
First suppose there is a single asset for trade (corresponding to the Franc in the Introduc-
tion) with payo¤:
a1 = v1 + v2.
In particular, the asset is a¤ected by both sources of fundamental risk, with the weight, ,
capturing the relative importance of the second risk. By symmetry, the equilibrium price is
given by p1 = 0. Substituting this expression, trader 1s mean-variance problem [cf. Eq. (1)]
can be written as:
max
x11
x11" 

2
 
1 + 2
  
x11
2
. (3)
The rst term in this expression is the traders expected payo¤ in equilibrium. The second
term is the traders expected cost from variance of her net worth. Trader 2s mean-variance
problem takes a similar form. Tradersequilibrium portfolios can be solved as:
x11 =
"

1
1 + 2
and x12 =  
"

1
1 + 2
, (4)
and their net worths are given by:
n1 = e+
"

v1 + v2
1 + 2
and n2 = e  "

v1 + v2
1 + 2
. (5)
Note that traders do not necessarily take large speculative positions because the assets payo¤
is inuenced by the risk, v2, as well as the risk, v1. In particular, traders positions (and
the riskiness of their net worths) are decreasing in , and they converge to zero as  limits
to innity. Intuitively, the ability to trade asset 1 enables traders to take only impure bets
because the assets payo¤ also responds to risks traders do not disagree about. To bet on their
belief disagreements, traders must also hold these additional risks [as formally captured by the
 term in problem (3)], which makes them reluctant to take large positions.
Next suppose a new asset is introduced (corresponding to the Euro in the Introduction)
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with payo¤:
a2 = v2.
Straightforward calculations show that tradersequilibrium portfolios are given by:
Trader 1 : x11 =
"

; x21 =  
"

, (6)
Trader 2 : x12 =  
"

; x22 = 
"

,
and their net worths are given by:
n1 = e+
"

v1 and n2 = e  "

v1. (7)
Note that the magnitude of traderspositions on asset 1 is greater than the earlier setting in
which asset 2 was not available [cf. Eqs. (6) and (4)]. Importantly, tradersnet worths are also
riskier [cf. Eqs. (7) and (5)]. Put di¤erently, the innovation of asset 2, about which traders
do not disagree, enables traders to take greater speculative positions on asset 1 and increases
their portfolio risks.
To understand these results, rst consider the portfolios in (6). Note that traders comple-
ment their speculative positions in asset 1 by taking the opposite positions in asset 2. These
complementary positions enable the traders to hedge the risk, v2, which they do not disagree
about. This in turn enables traders to take purer bets on the risk, v1. In fact, tradersnet
worths (7) are identical to those that would obtain if they could trade an alternative asset that
pays:
asyn = a1   a2 = v1: (8)
Traders createthis synthetic asset by simultaneously investing in multiple assets.
Next consider why traders increase their positions on asset 1 and why their net worths
become riskier. To understand these e¤ects, it is useful to consider the analogue of the mean-
variance problem (3) in this case. In terms of the synthetic asset in (8), trader 1 solves:
max
xsyn1
xsyn1 " 

2
(xsyn1 )
2 . (9)
Note that problems (3) and (9) are very similar, except that the former problem has an
additional factor of
 
1 + 2

multiplying the cost term. This di¤erence captures the hedging
e¤ect : The fact that traders use new assets to hedge the risks on their speculative positions
tends to reduce the riskiness of their net worths and the associated costs. In fact, controlling
for a traders speculative position on risk v1, i.e., assuming x
syn
1 = x
1
1, the hedging e¤ect leads
to a lower variance of net worth. In view of this observation, a naive view could suggest that
new assets on which there is complete agreement should reduce tradersportfolio risks.
However, the naive view misses an important amplication mechanism: the hedge-more/bet-
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more e¤ect. When traders are able to take purer bets, they also take larger bets. In this
example, the marginal cost (in terms of additional variance) of taking an additional speculative
position on v1 is lower when the second asset is available. This induces the trader to take a
larger speculative position in that case, i.e., x11 < x
syn
1 for the respective optima of problems
(3) and (9).
The amplication of speculative positions through the hedge-more/bet-more e¤ect tends to
increase the riskiness of tradersnet worths. Recall also that the direct hedging e¤ect tends to
reduce the riskiness of tradersnet worths. A priori, it is not clear that the amplication e¤ect
should be su¢ ciently strong to overcome the direct hedging e¤ect. However, this is always
the case for the standard mean-variance setting. In particular, since problems (3) and (9) are
linear-quadratic, their cost terms at optimum satisfy:
 
1 + 2
 
2
 
x11
2
<

2
(xsyn1 )
2 .
That is, the reduction in the marginal cost of taking speculative positions generates such a large
portfolio reaction that traderstotal costs (and net worth variances) increase. Consequently,
nancial innovation increases tradersportfolio risks even if traders agree about their payo¤s.
3 Environment and Equilibrium
The examples in the previous section illustrated the two channels by which nancial innovation
tends to increase portfolio risks. As illustrated by Example 1, there are also the traditional
risk sharing channels by which nancial innovation tends to decrease portfolio risks. The rest
of the paper considers a general mean-variance economy in which all of the channels of the
previous section are present. This section characterizes the equilibrium and shows that the
traders complete portfolios can be decomposed into risk sharing and speculative portfolios
which represent the two motives for trade in this economy. The subsequent sections consider
the e¤ect of nancial innovation on this equilibrium.
The economy in this section builds upon the environment in Section 2 by specifying the
uncertainty and the agentsbeliefs. The uncertainty in this economy is captured by the m
dimensional random variable, v = (v1; ::; vm)
0. Traders have potentially heterogeneous prior
beliefs about v. They agree about the variance of v, which simplies the analysis, but they
might disagree about the mean of v. In particular:
Assumption (A1). Trader is belief for the random variable v is given by the Normal
distribution, N (vi ;
v), where vi 2 Rm is the mean vector and v is an m m covariance
matrix with full row rank.
Tradersdate 1 endowment can be written in terms of v as:
wi = (Wi)
0 v,
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for someWi 2 Rm. Asset js payo¤ can also be written in terms of v as:
aj =
 
Aj
0
v,
for some Aj 2 Rm. The vectors, Aj	
j
, are linearly independent, which ensures
that the assets are not redundant. An economy is formally denoted by E (J) =
J ;

Aj
	
j2J ; fWigi ; fvi ;vgi

.
Note that I have not specied the empirical (or realized) distribution for v. This distribution
does not matter for much of the analysis in this paper. In particular, the mean of the empirical
distribution does not play a role in any of the results. This is because the main goal of this
paper is to characterize tradersportfolio risks, for which it is not necessary to take a position
on who is right on average. In addition, the variance of the empirical distribution plays only a
limited role. This is because tradersportfolio risks could be dened by using their perceived
variance, v, without reference to the empirical variance. This is the approach that will be
taken until Section 7. However, the empirical variance becomes of interest when the model is
taken to the data. Section 7 generalizes the main results of this paper to the case in which
portfolio risks are dened with the empirical variance.
3.1 Characterization of equilibrium
Given the above specication, trader i believes the asset payo¤s are Normally distributed,
N (i;), with:
i  A0vi and   A0vA.
Note that, in view of assumption (A1), traders agree about the variance of asset payo¤s while
they may disagree about their mean. In addition, trader i believes that her endowment is
Normally distributed, and that the covariance of her endowment with the asset payo¤s is given
by:
i = A
0vWi:
Given tradersbeliefs, the mean variance problem in (1) can be solved in closed form. In
particular, trader is portfolio demand is given by:
xi = 
 1

i   p
i
  i

. (10)
This expression illustrates the two sources of demand. First, the trader tends to hold a positive
position on an asset if its payo¤ is negatively correlated with her endowment, as captured by
the term, i. Second, she also tends to hold a positive position if she thinks the asset is
underpriced, as captured by the term, i pi .
Next consider the determination of the equilibrium price vector, p. Aggregating Eq. (10)
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and using market clearing, prices can be solved in closed form as:
p =
1
jIj
X
i2I
 
i
i   i

, (11)
where    Pi2I  1= jIj 1 is the Harmonic mean of tradersabsolute risk aversion coe¢ -
cients. Intuitively, the price of an asset is high either if the asset is negatively correlated with
tradersendowments (captured by the i term) or if traders on average believe that the asset
will yield a high payo¤ (captured by the i term). The beliefs of more risk averse traders have
a smaller e¤ect on the price since they bet relatively less on their opinions.
Using the price expression (11), trader is portfolio in (10) can also be solved in closed
form. In addition, trader is portfolio can be decomposed into two components that capture
the two motives for trade in this economy. In particular,
xi = x
R
i + x
S
i , where (12)
xRi =   1~i and xSi =  1
~i
i
.
Here,
~i = i  

i
1
jIj
X
{2I
{ (13)
denotes the relative covariance of trader is endowment, and
~i = i  
1
jIj
X
{2I

{
{ (14)
denotes the relative optimism of trader i. Note that xRi would be the traders equilibrium
portfolio if there were no belief di¤erences (i.e., if ~i = 0 for each i). Hence, I refer to x
R
i as
the risk sharing portfolio of trader i. On the other hand, the residual portfolios,

xSi
	
i
, are
purely driven by belief di¤erences. Thus, I refer to xSi as the speculative portfolio of trader i.
To understand the economic forces that operate in this economy, it is useful to investigate in
more detail the determinants of the risk sharing and the speculative portfolios.
Economic determinants of the risk sharing portfolios. Eqs. (12) and (13) show that
the risk sharing portfolios allocate risks e¢ ciently through two distinct channels: (i) they
diversify idiosyncratic risks, (ii) and they transfer aggregate risks to those traders who are
best able to bear them. To understand the rst (diversication) channel, consider the special
case in which i =  for each i. In this case, Eq. (13) illustrates that all risk sharing trades
are driven by di¤erences in the covariances of tradersendowments with asset payo¤s. If an
asset covaries equally with all tradersendowments, then this asset earns a risk premium [as
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captured by Eq. (11)], but it does not generate trade. If instead the asset covaries more with
some tradersendowments than others, then this asset generates trade which facilitates the
diversication of risks. To understand the second (risk-transfer) channel, consider the special
case in which there are two traders with i < {. Suppose also that traders have perfectly
correlated endowment risks so there is no scope for diversication. Finally, suppose that there
is an asset which is correlated with tradersendowments, so that i = { 6= 0. In this case, the
weighted average in Eq. (13) illustrates that ~i and ~{ are non-zero even though i = {. This
in turn generates trade which facilitates the transfer of risks from trader { who has a higher
risk aversion to trader i who has a lower risk aversion.
Economic determinants of the speculative portfolios. The channels captured by the
risk sharing portfolios correspond to the traditional benets of nancial innovation. The novel
e¤ects in this economy are captured by the speculative portfolios,

xSi
	
i
. Eq. (14) shows
that that the speculative portfolios are determined by traders belief disagreements. If the
trader i is more optimistic for some assets than the (weighted) average belief of other traders,
then she holds a non-zero speculative portfolio. The opposite side of these trades are taken
by those traders that are less optimistic than the average. Put di¤erently, the speculative
portfolios enable the traders to bet on their di¤erent views. As implied by the decomposition,
xi = x
R
i +x
S
i , these speculative portfolios distort the traderscomplete portfolios relative to a
benchmark in which the only motive for trade is risk sharing.
4 The Average Variance and Its Decomposition
Eqs. (11)  (14) complete the characterization of equilibrium in this economy. The main goal
of this paper is to analyze the e¤ect of nancial innovation on portfolio risks. To this end,
this section denes the average variance of tradersnet worths as an appropriate measure of
portfolio risks for this economy. It then shows that the average variance can be decomposed
into uninsurable and speculative components. The main result in the next section characterizes
the e¤ect of nancial innovation on each of these components.
Given the mean-variance framework, a natural measure of portfolio risk for a trader i is the
variance of her net worth, vari (ni). I consider an average of this measure across all traders,
the average variance, dened as follows:

 =
1
jIj
X
i2I
i

vari (ni) ,
=
1
jIj
X
i2I
i

 
W0i
vWi + 2x
0
ii + x
0
ixi

. (15)
A couple comments about this denition are in order. First, note that the portfolio risk of a
trader is calculated according to her own belief. Section 7 generalizes the main results to the
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case in which portfolio risks are dened by using the empirical distribution for the underlying
risks. Second, note that traders that are relatively more risk averse are given a greater weight
in the average.
There are at least two justications for considering the average variance, 
, as the appropri-
ate measure of portfolio risks for this economy. For a rst justication, consider the certainty
equivalent aggregate net worth in this economy according to the belief of an arbitrary trader
{, given by:
N{ =
X
i2I

E{ [ni]  i
2
var{ (ni)

,
=
X
i2I
E{

e  x0ip+ wi + x0ia
  i
2
vari (ni) ,
= E{
"X
i2I
e+ wi
#
 
X
i2I
i
2
vari (ni) .
Here, the second line replaces var{ (ni) with vari (ni) in view of the assumption that traders
agree on the variances and the last line uses the market clearing condition,
P
i2I xi = 0. This
expression illustrates that the certainty equivalent aggregate net worth can be decomposed
into two components: An expected endowment component which does not depend on traders
portfolios, and a variance loss component which depends on the portfolios. Moreover, the vari-
ance loss component is a constant scaling of the average variance, 
. Consequently, choosing
portfolios to maximize the certainty equivalent aggregate net worth according to any traders
beliefs is equivalent to choosing them to minimize the average variance, 
. Intuitively, the
portfolio allocations in this economy do not generate expected net worth since they simply re-
distribute wealth across traders. Hence, the portfolios a¤ect the certainty equivalent aggregate
net worth only through their e¤ect on the variance. For each trader, the certainty equivalent
loss from variance is proportional to her coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion, which justies the
form of 
 in (15).
A second justication for the average variance, 
, is provided by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The risk sharing portfolios,

xRi
	
i
, minimize the average variance, 
, among all
feasible portfolios:
min
fxi2RjJjgi

 s.t.
X
i
xi = 0. (16)
Equivalently, they maximize the certainty equivalent aggregate net worth, N{, according to the
belief of any trader, {.
If there are no belief disagreements, i.e., ~vi = 0 for each i, then the complete portfolios
and the risk sharing portfolios coincide, i.e., xi = xRi for each i. Thus, Lemma 1 shows that
without belief disagreements the equilibrium portfolios, fxigi, minimize the average variance, 

(equivalently, they maximize the certainty equivalent aggregate net worth). This result further
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illustrates that 
 is the natural measure of portfolio risks in this economy. In particular, this
is the measure of risks that would be minimized in equilibrium absent belief disagreements.
In view of Lemma 1, I let 
R denote the minimum for problem (16) and refer to it as the
uninsurable variance. The extent to which 
 deviates from 
R (and the certainty equivalent
aggregate net worth deviates from its maximum possible value) could be viewed as the e¤ect
of speculation based on belief disagreements. I thus dene 
S = 
   
R and refer to it
as the speculative variance. This provides a decomposition of the average variance into the
uninsurable and the speculative components,

 = 
R + 
S :
The next lemma characterizes the two components of average variance in terms of the exogenous
parameters of the model.
Lemma 2. The uninsurable variance is given by:

R =
1
jIj
X
i2I
i


W0i
vWi   ~0i 1~i

, (17)
and the speculative variance is given by:

S  1jIj
X
i2I
i


~i
i
0
 1
~i
i

. (18)
The forms of 
R and 
S are intuitive. Eq. (17) illustrates that the uninsurable variance
is lower when the assets provide better risk sharing opportunities, captured by larger ~i.
Similarly, Eq. (18) illustrates that the speculative variance is greater when the assets feature
greater belief disagreements, captured by larger ~i. The next sections characterize the e¤ect
of nancial innovation on 
R and 
S .
5 Financial Innovation and Portfolio Risks
I model nancial innovation as an expansion of the set of traded assets. For this purpose, it is
useful to dene economies in which only a subset of the assets in J are traded. In particular,
given J^  J , let E

J^

=

J^ ;

Aj
	
j2J^ ; fWigi ; fvi ;vgi

denote the economy in which the
asset set is given by J^ . Where it does not create confusion, I also use the notation, z

J^

, to
refer to the equilibrium variable z for the economy E

J^

.
To capture nancial innovation, suppose J can be broken down into a set of old assets,
JO, and a set of new assets, JN (formally, J = JO [ JN where JO and JN are disjoint sets).
The di¤erences between the economies E (JO) and E (JO [ JN ) can be attributed to nancial
innovation. I next present the main result.
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Theorem 1 (Financial Innovation and Portfolio Risks). Consider the average variance
and its components respectively for the economies E (JO) and E (JO [ JN ).
(i) Financial innovation always reduces the uninsurable variance, that is:

R (JO [ JN )  
R (JO) .
(ii) Financial innovation always increases the speculative variance, that is:

S (JO [ JN )  
S (JO) .
(ii) For any  > 0, there exist economies in which the increase in the speculative variance
is su¢ ciently large that nancial innovation increases the average variance by at least , that
is, 
 (JO [ JN ) > 
 (JO) + .
The rst part of this theorem is a corollary of Lemma 1, and it shows that nancial
innovation always provides some risk sharing benets. This part formalizes the traditional
view of nancial innovation in the context of this model. On the other hand, the second
part of the theorem identies a second force which always operates in the opposite direction.
In particular, when there are belief disagreements, nancial innovation also always increases
the speculative variance. Hence, the net e¤ect of nancial innovation on average variance is
ambiguous, and it depends on the relative strength of the two forces.
Most of the literature on nancial innovation considers the special case without belief
disagreements. Theorem 1 shows that the common-beliefs assumption is restrictive, as it shuts
down an important economic force by which nancial innovation always has a positive e¤ect
on portfolio risks. Furthermore, the third part of the theorem shows that it is indeed possible
for the force from belief disagreements to dominate the traditional force.
It is also worth emphasizing the generality of the second part of Theorem 1. The result
applies for all sets of existing and new assets, JO and JN , with no restrictions on the joint
distribution of asset payo¤s or tradersbeliefs for v [except for the relatively mild Assumption
(A1)]. For example, Theorem 1 shows that nancial innovation increases the speculative
variance even if there are no belief disagreements about new assets. This is surprising because,
as illustrated by Example 2, new assets are used to hedge (to some extent) the risks from
tradersspeculation on their existing disagreements. Put di¤erently, the direct hedging e¤ect
of new assets tends to reduce 
S . However, as illustrated by Example 2, there is also the
hedge-more/bet-more e¤ect which tends to increase 
S . Theorem 1 shows that, in the standard
mean-variance framework, the hedge-more/bet-more e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong that new assets
always increase 
S .
The rest of this section provides a sketch proof and a complementary intuition for the second
part of Theorem 1 (the proofs for the rst and the third parts relegated to the Appendix).
The proof proceeds in four steps. First, the form of xSi in Eq. (12) implies that the speculative
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portfolio, xSi , solves the following version of the mean-variance problem:
max
xi2RJ^
(~i)
0 xi   i
2
x0ixi. (19)
Moreover, the speculative variance, 
S , is found by averaging the variance costs for each trader
at the solution to this problem:

S =
1
jIj
X
i
i

 
xSi
0
xSi . (20)
Intuitively, problem (19) is the tradersmean-variance problem in a hypothetical economy that
is identical except that traders have no background risks (i.e., Wi = 0 for all i 2 I), so that
the only motive for trade is speculation. The solution to this problem gives the speculative
portfolio in the actual economy, and also determines the speculative variance as captured by
(20).
Second, note that nancial innovation relaxes the constraint set of problem (19), which
in turn increases the optimum value of the problem. That is, when the asset set is J^ =
JO [ JN , traders are able to make all the speculative trades they could make when the asset
set is J^ = JO, and some more. Put di¤erently, new assets expand the betting possibilities
frontier for traders, which in turn increases their certainty-equivalent payo¤s from betting.
This observation, which is central for the result, further reinforces the messages of Examples
1 and 2. In particular, nancial innovation increases the betting possibilities frontier through
two distinct channels. As emphasized by Example 1, new assets are likely to generate new
disagreements. In addition, as emphasized by Example 2, even if new assets do not generate
disagreements themselves, they enable the traders to take purer bets on existing disagreements.
Both of these channels manifest themselves as an expansion of the constraint set of problem
(19).
Third, since problem (19) is a quadratic optimization problem, at the optimum traders
expected payo¤s, (~i)
0 xi, are proportional to their variance costs, i2 x
0
ixi. In particular:
(~i)
0 xsi = 2
i
2
(xsi )
0 xsi . (21)
Consequently, nancial innovation increases not only the certainty-equivalent payo¤ but also
both of its components: the expected payo¤, (~i)
0 xsi , and the variance, (x
s
i )
0 xsi . For intuition,
consider the introduction of an asset for which trader i is optimistic. The introduction of this
asset naturally increases the expected return for this trader. However, the trader responds
by increasing her investments to a point that she also takes greater risks than before. At the
optimal portfolio, higher expected returns go hand-in-hand with higher risks as captured by
Eq. (21).
The nal step combines the third and the rst steps to prove Theorem 1. As nancial inno-
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vation increases the speculative variance of each trader, it also increases the average speculative
variance in Eq. (20) (see Appendix A.2 for an alternative proof based on matrix algebra).
A complementary intuition for Theorem 1 can be provided by characterizing tradersspec-
ulative risks in terms of the Sharpe ratios of their speculative portfolios. To this end, consider
the hypothetical economy in the above proof in which there are no background risks. Dene
the speculative Sharpe ratio of a trader as the Sharpe ratio of her portfolio in this hypothetical
economy.4 The speculative Sharpe ratio of a trader i can be calculated as:
SharpeSi =
 
xSi
0
(i   p)q 
xSi
0
xSi
=
q
~0i 1~i, (22)
where the second equality follows from Eqs. (11)   (14). In addition, the standard devia-
tion of the traders net worth in the hypothetical economy can be written as
q 
xSi
0
xSi =
1
i
p
~0i 1~i. Dividing this by the initial net worth, e, the standard deviation of the traders
portfolio return can be written as:
Si  std
ni
e

=
1
ie
q
~0i 1~i. (23)
Note that the ratio, ie, provides a measure of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion for trader
i. Thus, combining Eqs. (22) and (23) gives the familiar result that the standard deviation
of the portfolio return is equal to the Sharpe ratio of the optimal portfolio divided by the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion (see Campbell and Viceira, 2002). This textbook result
applies also in this model when there are no background risks.
Theorem 1 can then be understood from the lenses of Eqs. (22) and (23). Financial
innovation increases the tradersspeculative Sharpe ratios by expanding the betting possibil-
ities frontier through the two channels emphasized before. Once traders are able to obtain
higher Sharpe ratios, they also undertake greater speculative risks, providing a complementary
intuition for Theorem 1.
6 Endogenous Financial Innovation
The analysis so far has taken the set of new assets as exogenous. In practice, many nancial
products are introduced endogenously by economic agents with prot incentives. A large
literature emphasizes risk sharing as a major driving force for endogenous nancial innovation
[see, for example, Allen and Gale (1994), Du¢ e and Rahi (1995), Demange and Laroque
(1995), Athanasoulis and Shiller (2000, 2001)].5 A natural question, in view of the results in
4Recall that the Sharpe ratio of a portoio is dened as the expected portfolio return in excess of the risk-free
rate (which is normalized to 0 in this model) divided by the standard deviation of the portfolio return.
5Risk sharing is one of several drivers of nancial innovation emphasized by the previous literature. Other
factors include mitigating agency frictions, reducing asymmetric information, minimizing transaction costs, and
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the earlier sections, is to what extent the risk sharing motive for nancial innovation is robust
to the presence of belief disagreements. To address this question, this section endogenizes the
asset design by introducing a prot seeking market maker and obtains two main results. First,
the optimal asset design depends on the size and the nature of tradersbelief disagreements,
in addition to the possibilities for risk sharing. Second, when tradersbelief disagreements are
su¢ ciently large, the market maker designs assets that maximize traders average portfolio
risks among all possible choices, completely disregarding the risk sharing motive for nancial
innovation.
The main feature of the model in this section is that the assets, J , are introduced by a
market maker. The market maker is constrained to choose jJ j < m assets, but is otherwise free
to choose the asset design, A. Here, recall that the matrix, A =

A1;A2; ::;AjJ j

, captures
the asset payo¤s which are given by aj =
 
Aj
0
v for each j. Thus, the market makers choice
of A a¤ects the belief disagreements and the relative covariances according to [cf. Eqs. (14)
and (13)]:
~i (A) = A
0~vi and ~i (A) = A
0v ~Wi,
where the deviation terms are dened as:
~vi = 
v
i  
1
jIj
X
{2I

{
v{ and ~Wi =Wi  

i
1
jIj
X
{2I
W{.
Once the market maker chooses the asset design, A, the assets are traded in a competitive
market similar to the previous sections. The market maker intermediates these trades which
enables it to extract some of the surplus from traders. To keep the analysis simple, suppose
the market maker can extract the full surplus.6 In particular, the market maker sets a xed
membership fee, i, for each trader i and makes a take it or leave it o¤er. If trader i accepts
the o¤er, then she can trade the available assets in the competitive market. Otherwise, trader
i is out of the market, and her net worth is given by her endowment, e+W0iv.
The equilibrium of this economy can be characterized backwards. First consider the com-
petitive equilibrium after the market maker has chosen A and traders decided whether or not
to participate in the market. Assume that all traders have accepted the o¤er, which will be
the case in equilibrium. In view of the mean-variance framework, tradersportfolio choices are
independent of the xed fees they have paid. In particular, the equilibrium is characterized as
in the earlier sections.
Next consider the xed fees the market maker charges for a given choice of A. If trader i
rejects the o¤er, she receives the certainty equivalent payo¤ from her endowment. Otherwise,
sidestepping taxes and regulation (see Tufano, 2004, for a recent survey). These other factors, while clearly
important, are left out of the analysis in this paper to focus on the e¤ect of belief disagreements on the risk
sharing motive for innovation.
6The results below remain unchanged under the less extreme (reduced form) assumption that the market
maker extracts a constant fraction,  2 (0; 1], of the surplus regardless of the choice of A.
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she receives the certainty equivalent payo¤ from her equilibrium portfolio net of the xed
fee, i (A). The market maker sets i (A) so that the trader is just indi¤erent to accept the
o¤er. Straightforward calculations (relegated to Appendix A.3) show that the market makers
expected total prots are given by:
X
i2I
i (A) =
X
i
i
2

~i (A)
i
  ~i (A)
0
 1

~i (A)
i
  ~i (A)

. (24)
This expression reects the two motives for trade in this economy. Traders are willing to pay
to trade assets that facilitate better risk sharing [i.e., larger ~i (A)], or to trade assets that
generate greater belief disagreements [i.e., larger ~i (A)].
The market maker chooses an asset design, A, that maximizes the expected prots in (24).
Note that many choices of A represent the same trading opportunities over the space of the
underlying risks, v (and thus, also generate the same prots). Thus, suppose without loss of
generality that the market makers choice is subject to the following normalizations:
 = A0vA = IjJ j, and

(v)1=2A
j
1
 0 for each j 2 J . (25)
Here, (v)1=2 denotes the unique positive denite square root of the matrix, v. The rst
condition in (25) normalizes the variance of assets to be the identity matrix, IjJ j. This condition
determines the column vectors of the matrix for normalized asset payo¤s, (v)1=2A, up to a
sign. The second condition resolves the remaining indeterminacy by adopting a sign convention
for these column vectors.
Theorem 2 (Optimal Asset Design). Suppose the matrix
1
jIj
X
i
i


(v) 1=2
~vi
i
  (v)1=2 ~Wi

(v) 1=2
~vi
i
  (v)1=2 ~Wi
0
(26)
is non-singular. Then, an asset design is optimal if and only if the columns of the matrix for
normalized asset payo¤s, (v)1=2A, correspond to the eigenvectors corresponding to the jJ j
largest eigenvalues of the matrix in (26). If the eigenvalues are distinct, then the asset design
is uniquely determined by this condition along with the normalizations in (25). Otherwise, the
asset design is determined up to a choice of the jJ j largest eigenvalues.
This result generalizes the results in Demange and Laroque (1995) and Athanasoulis and
Shiller (2000) to the case with belief disagreements, ~vi 6= 0. Importantly, the expressions (24)
and (26) show that nancial innovation is partly driven by the size and the nature of traders
belief disagreements. The size of the belief disagreements,
(v) 1=2 ~vi , (along with the
risk aversion coe¢ cients, i) determine to what extent endogenous innovation is driven by the
speculation motive for trade as opposed to risk sharing. Assuming that this term is signicant,
the nature of the belief disagreements, (
v) 1=2~vi
jj(v) 1=2~vi jj , bias the choice of assets towards those
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that maximize the opportunities for speculation.
The next result characterizes the optimal asset design further in two extreme cases: when
traders have common beliefs, and when their belief disagreements are very large.
Theorem 3 (Optimal Asset Design and Portfolio Risks). Consider a collection of
economies, fEKgK2R+, which are identical except for beliefs given by vi;K = Kvi for all
i. For each economy EK , suppose the matrix in (26) is non-singular with distinct eigenvalues.7
Let 
K () denote the average variance and AK denote the optimal asset design (characterized
in Theorem 2) for economy EK .
(i) If K = 0, then the market maker innovates assets that minimize the average variance:
A0 2 argmin
A^

0

A^

subject to (25) .
For the next two parts, suppose there exists at least two traders with di¤erent beliefs, i.e.,
vi 6= v{ for some i;{ 2 I. Let 
K (;) denote the average variance without any assets.
(ii) As K !1, the market maker innovates assets that maximize the average variance:8
lim
K!1
AK 2 argmax
A^

lim
K!1
1
K2

K

A^

subject to (25) . (27)
(iii) For any  > 0, there exists K such that if K > K, then endogenous nancial
innovation increases the average variance at least by :

K (AK)  
K (;) + .
Without belief disagreements, the market maker innovates assets that minimize average
portfolio risks in this economy, as illustrated by the rst part of the theorem. The second
part provides a sharp contrast to this traditional view. When tradersbelief disagreements
are large, the market maker innovates assets that maximize average portfolio risks, completely
disregarding the risk sharing motive for innovation. Thus, belief disagreements change the
nature of nancial innovation as well as its impact on portfolio risks.
The third part considers the intermediate cases in which both the risk sharing and specula-
tion considerations play a role in nancial innovation. As long as tradersbelief disagreements
are su¢ ciently large, the speculation force dominates and the endogenous innovation increases
the average variance by an arbitrary amount. This part complements the main result, The-
orem 1, by identifying su¢ cient conditions under which assets that increase portfolio risks
endogenously emerge in this economy.
7The assumption of distinct eigenvalues can be relaxed at the expense of additional notation.
8The scale factor, 1
K2
, in (27) ensures that the objective function remains bounded in the limit, so that the
optimization problem is well dened.
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7 Financial Innovation and Empirical Portfolio Risks
The analysis so far described the e¤ect of nancial innovation on tradersportfolio risks calcu-
lated according to their own beliefs [cf. Eq. (15)]. However, to take the model to the data, it
is necessary to consider an empirical version of tradersportfolio risks, that is, the risks that
would be reected ex-post in the data. This section shows that, under a slight strengthening of
assumption (A1), the main result, Theorem 1, continues to hold after replacing the perceived
variances in its statement with empirical variances.
In this section, suppose that the underlying risks, v, have an empirical (or ex-post realized)
distribution denoted by N
 
vemp;
v
emp

. Suppose also that tradersbeliefs are related to the
empirical distribution. In particular, traders know the empirical variance, vemp, but they
do not know the empirical mean, vemp. Trader i has a prior belief for the empirical mean
parameter, vemp, given by the Normal distribution, N (
v
i ;
v
i ). The following assumption
about beliefs simplies the analysis in this section:
Assumption (A1S). For each i, vi = 
 1vemp for some constant  > 0.
This assumption implies the earlier assumption (A1), because the traders marginal belief
for v can be written as:
N (vi ;
v) , where v = vemp + 
v
i =

1 +
1


vemp.
The stronger assumption (A1S) is useful because it ensures that there is a linear wedge between
traders (common) perceived variance, v, and the empirical variance, vemp. The size of
the wedge is controlled by the parameter,  , which captures the precision of tradersbeliefs.
Intuitively, tradersperceived uncertainty for v is greater than the empirical uncertainty of v
because they face additional parameter uncertainty.
Note that the empirical and perceived variances coincide when  = 1, i.e., when traders
beliefs are very precise. Thus, in this special case, all of the results of earlier sections apply
for the empirical variance as well as the perceived variance of net worths. When  < 1,
it is not immediately clear that the analogues of earlier results would hold for the empirical
variance. The rest of this section shows that this is the case. The following result establishes
that, assuming  = 1 is without loss of generality as long as the risk aversion coe¢ cients,
figi, are appropriately adjusted. To state the result, dene the empirical average variance as:

emp =
1
jIj
X
i2I
i

varemp (ni) . (28)
Dene also the empirical uninsurable variance, 
Remp as the solution to problem (16) with 

in the optimization replaced by 
emp. Finally, dene the empirical speculative variance as the
residual, 
Semp = 
emp   
Remp.
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Lemma 3. Consider an economy E (J) that satises assumption (A1S). Consider an alterna-
tive economy, Eemp (J), which is identical to E (J) except for two aspects: (i) tradersprecision
parameter is adjusted according to  emp = 1, and (ii) traders risk aversion coe¢ cients are
also adjusted according to:
emp;i =

1 +
1


i for each i. (29)
Then,
(i) The equilibrium,
 
p;
 
x1; ::;xjIj

, is the same in economies E (J) and Eemp (J).
(ii) The empirical average variance and its components, 
emp;
Remp;

S
emp, are the same in
economies E (J) and Eemp (J).
For a proof of this result, consider the demand expression in Eq. (10). Inspecting this
equation for both economies, Eemp (J) and E (J), shows that the demand functions are the
same. It follows that the equilibrium portfolios are also identical, proving part (i). Intuitively,
traders in economy E (J) are reluctant to take risky positions not only because they are risk
averse but also because they face additional parameter uncertainty. This makes them e¤ectively
more risk averse, as captured by the adjustment in (29). In fact, emp;i could be viewed as
trader is e¤ective coe¢ cient of risk aversion.
Next note that the empirical variance of a traders net worth is also the same in economies
E (J) and Eemp (J), because the di¤erences between these economies do not concern the em-
pirical distributions. In addition, the adjustment of the risk aversion coe¢ cient in (29) does
not a¤ect the relative weights used in averaging the variances of net worths [cf. Eq. (28)].
It follows that the empirical average variance and its components are the same in the two
economies, proving part (ii).
Lemma 3 is useful because in the alternative economy, Eemp (J), the empirical and the
perceived variances coincide. Thus, applying the earlier results for this economy characterizes
the e¤ect of nancial innovation on the empirical variances in the original economy, E (J). In
particular, the following result follows as a corollary of Lemma 3 and Theorem 1.
Theorem 4 (Financial Innovation and Empirical Portfolio Risks). Consider an econ-
omy E (J) that satises assumption (A1S), and let JO and JN respectively denote the set of
old and new assets. Financial innovation always decreases the empirical uninsurable variance
and increases the empirical speculative variance, that is:

Remp (JO [ JN )  
Remp (JO) and 
Semp (JO [ JN )  
Semp (JO) .
A similar argument implies that the analogues of the results in Section 6 hold for empirical
variances. As suggested by these results, under assumption (A1S), the e¤ects of nancial
innovation can be analyzed by assuming  =1 (and appropriately adjusting the risk aversion
coe¢ cients) so that the perceived and empirical variances coincide.
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8 A Quantitative Exploration
The results in the previous sections have theoretically established that belief disagreements,
when they are su¢ ciently large, change the nature of nancial innovation as well as its e¤ect
on portfolio risks. A natural question is how large belief disagreements should be to make
these results practically relevant. To address this question, this section considers a calibration
of the model in the context of the national income markets, rst proposed by Shiller (1993),
and analyzed in detail by Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001).
Assets whose payo¤s are linked to (various combinations of) national incomes could in
principle facilitate the sharing of income risks among di¤erent countries. Athanasoulis and
Shiller (2001) characterize the optimal design of such assets. They also calibrate their model
for G7 countries, and argue that the innovation of a couple of these assets would lead to large
welfare gains in view of the reduction in individuals income and consumption risks. I rst
replicate their empirical results by mapping their model (and calibration) to this framework. I
then show that, with reasonable amounts of belief disagreements, the new assets proposed by
Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001) would have the unintended consequence of increasing individ-
ualsincome and consumption risks. Finally, I consider endogenous nancial innovation in this
setting and illustrate that, with belief disagreements, new assets that would be designed by
a prot seeking market maker are di¤erent than those proposed by Athanasoulis and Shiller
(2001).
8.1 Replicating Athanasoulis and Shillers (2001) results in this framework
Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001) consider a dynamic risk sharing model with CARA preferences
and Normal shocks. Individuals with uncertain incomes are allowed to trade a xed number
of assets whose payo¤s are linear combinations of their incomes. Athanasoulis and Shiller
(2001) characterize the optimal design of these assets and the e¤ect of their introduction on
risk sharing.
In view of the CARA preferences, certain aspects of Athanasoulis and Shillers (2001)
dynamic model are isomorphic to a static model. In particular, the equilibrium portfolios of
risky assets are identical to the portfolios in a static model in which individuals face the same
income shocks. Moreover, the CARA preferences ensure that the variance of each individuals
consumption is the same as the variance of her net income, that is, her income excluding
capital gains from her asset holdings (but including dividend gains). Given the equivalence for
the portfolios of risky assets, the variance of net income in the dynamic model is equal to the
variance of net worth in the static model. Thus, the variance of net worth in the static model
accurately describes both income and consumption risks in the dynamic model.9 In the rest
9The dynamic aspects of the model are useful to analyze the precautionary savings motive and to determine
the equilibrium interest rates, but they do not play a role in analyzing consumption risks. The proof of the
equivalence results between the dynamic and the static models (along with a complete solution of the dynamic
model with belief disagreements) is in Appendix B which is available on request.
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of this section, I present the results in terms of consumption risks.
To make the mapping between models more precise, consider the empirical part of Athana-
soulis and Shiller (2001) in which they analyze the income shocks in G7 countries. They assume
that the per-capita income of a country c 2 C = f1; ::; jCjg evolves exogenously according to:
yt (c)  yt 1 (c) = t 1 (c) + vt (c) .
Here, t 1 (c) is predetermined at date t  1, and vt (c) is a zero-mean random variable which
captures the income shock for country c between dates t   1 and t. In addition, the income
shocks, vt = fvt (c)gc, are assumed to be i.i.d. and uncorrelated over time (but shocks to
di¤erent countries are allowed to be correlated). Let N
 
0;vemp

denote the empirical variance
of vt.
To map this analysis to my framework, consider an economy in which the underlying risks
correspond to the income shocks, v (where the time index is dropped to simplify the notation).
Denote the individuals in country c with I (c), so that I = [ jCjc=1 I (c) corresponds to the set
of all individuals. Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001) assume that individuals have the same
coe¢ cients of risk aversion, i.e., i =  for each i. They also simplify the analysis by assuming
that individuals in the same country experience the same income shocks.10 This implies that
the income shock of an individual i (c) in economy c is given by
 
Wi(c)
0
v, where
Wi(c);m =
(
1, if c = m,
0, otherwise.
It remains to specify the beliefs in this economy. Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001) assume
that individuals have homogeneous (and rational) beliefs for the income shocks, v. In contrast,
I consider the setup in the previous section in which traders know the variance, vemp, but they
may disagree about the mean, vemp. I also adopt assumption (A1
S), which ensures that the
precision of tradersbeliefs is captured by the single parameter,  . To simplify the exposition,
I assume  = 1 so that the empirical and the perceived variances coincide, i.e., vemp = v.
In view of Lemma 3, this is without loss of generality as long as the parameters, figi, are
interpreted as e¤ective coe¢ cients of risk aversion [cf. Eq. (29)].
In addition, given any individual i and country c, I assume that the mean of the individuals
belief for the countrys income shock is an i.i.d. draw from a Normal random variable:
vi (c)  N

0;

(c)
2
:
The assumption that a traders beliefs for di¤erent countries are independent simplies the
analysis, but otherwise does not play an important role. With this specication, the amount
10While clearly counterfactual, this assumption enables them to focus on international risk sharing and to
take advantage of the higher quality national income data.
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of belief disagreements for country c is captured by the parameter, (c): the cross sectional
standard deviation of the beliefs for the mean of country cs income shock. It is useful to
normalize this parameter with the standard deviation of the income shock,
v(c) =
(c)
v(c)
.
With this normalization, v(c) provides a measure of belief disagreements that is independent of
the linear transformations of v (c). I also simplify the exposition by assuming that the amount
of belief disagreements are the same for all G7 countries, that is:
v(c) = v for some constant v  0:
The model in Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001) corresponds to the special case, v = 0. I analyze
the robustness of their results by considering the cases in which v is positive but small.
For the other parameters of the model, I use exactly the estimates and calibration of
Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001). To estimate the variance matrix, v, they propose a spatial
correlation model which yields the following structural form:
(v)c;c
0
=
(
exp
 
world

+ exp
 
country

+ exp
 
spatial

, if c = c0
exp
 
spatial

exp ( d (c; c0)) , if c 6= c0 .
Here, world; country; spatial capture standard deviations of respectively world-wide shocks,
country specic shocks, and spatial shocks that are partially correlated across countries. The
strength of this spatial correlation depends on the parameter, , and the geographic distance,
d (c; c0), between the two countries. Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001) estimate the parameters,
world; country; spatial; , using per-capita gross domestic products in 1985 U.S. dollars from
the Penn World Table over the years 1950-1992. I use their parameter estimates along with
data on distances to reconstruct their estimate for the variance matrix, v. Finally, Athana-
soulis and Shiller (2001) consider a relative risk aversion coe¢ cient of three, relative = 3, as
representing a consensus by many who work in this literature.This enables them to calibrate
the absolute risk aversion coe¢ cient as  = 
relative
y = 0:000203, where y = $14783:43 denotes
the average per-capita income of G7 countries in 1992. As a benchmark, I choose the same
calibration as the (e¤ective) coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion in my setting. I discuss the
e¤ect of alternative calibrations of this parameter later in this section.
Finally, consider the asset design, A, in this economy. Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001)
assume that the assets are designed by a planner to maximize a social welfare function. The
top panel of Figure 1 illustrates this optimal asset design when jJ j = 2. The most important
asset to create resembles an income swap between the US and Japan. Intuitively, this asset
enables risk sharing between the individuals in the US and Japan. The model picks the US
and Japan because these are large countries whose income shocks are relatively less correlated
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Figure 1: The top table illustrates the asset design and the equilibrium portfolios for the
benchmark without belief disagremeents (with two assets). The last two columns display
the asset design normalized by the country populations, jIcj, for comparison with Table 1 of
Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001). The bottom table shows the e¤ect of nancial innovation
on consumption risks in the US. The columns display the slope coe¢ cients in the following
regression, Consumption = +
P7
c=1 cvc, which has a perfect t in the model.
(since they are geographically far), which increases the benets from risk sharing. The second
most important asset also resembles an income swap, this time between Japan and the core
EU region, for a similar reason.
When there are no belief disagreements, i.e., v = 0, my analysis replicates the results in
Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001). First, the endogenous asset design characterized in Section 6
is the same as in Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001). In particular, without belief disagreements,
a prot seeking market maker would choose the same set of assets as the social planner in
Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001).
Second, the individualsequilibrium holdings of risky assets are identical in both settings.
The top table of Figure 1 illustrates these equilibrium portfolios (cf. Table 1 of Athanasoulis
and Shiller, 2001). Much of the trade in the rst asset is among the individuals in Japan and
the US who take the opposite positions to diversify their income risks. Similarly, much of the
trade in the second asset is among the individuals in Japan and the core Euro region.
Third, the portfolio risks of individuals in this setting is the same as the consumption risks
of individuals in Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001). The second panel of Figure 1 illustrates these
consumption risks for a sample country, the US. Before nancial innovation, the consumption
of individuals in the US has an exposure of one to the US income shock, vUS , and an exposure
of zero to the income shocks of other countries. Trading the new nancial assets enables the
individuals to reduce their exposure to the US income shock by taking on some exposure to the
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Figure 2: The left table illustrates the e¤ect of nancial innovation on consumption risks
in di¤erent countries. The right table plots the average standard deviation of consumption
growth,
p

=y, as a function of the number of new assets.
income shocks of other countries (in particular, Japan). Consequently, the individuals in the
US are able to diversify and reduce their consumption risks. According to Athanasoulis and
Shillers (2001) estimates, the individuals are able to reduce the standard deviation of their
consumption from about $364 to $315:4 (in 1985 dollars) by trading two assets. Introducing
additional assets reduces risks further but there are diminishing returns. Introducing all seven
assets, which would complete the international markets, would reduce this measure to $314:4.
The left table of Figure 2 illustrates the e¤ect of the introduction of new assets on the
standard deviation of consumption in each country. With two assets, the US and Japan gain
the most but consumption risks decline in all countries. Guided by the analysis in earlier
sections, I also consider an average measure for consumption risks,
p

=y: The quadratic
average standard deviation of consumption divided by the per-capita income, y = $14783:43.
Note that
p

=y is an average of the standard deviation of consumption growth over individuals
in G7 countries. The right panel of Figure 2 illustrates that
p

=y declines from 2:46% to 2:21%
with two assets, and it declines further to 2:13% with complete markets.
I next consider the robustness of these results to the presence of belief disagreements, v > 0.
As a rst step, I take the asset design in Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001) as exogenously given,
which is useful to see the direct impact of belief disagreements on consumption risks. I then
analyze the e¤ect of belief disagreements, v > 0, on the endogenous asset design.
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Figure 3: The top table illustrates the equilibrium portfolios with belief disagreements (v =
0:02). The third and the fourth columns illustrate the risk sharing portfolios in country c. These
are also the complete portfolios of moderates, who have the mean belief for each country. The
last two columns illustrate the speculative portfolios of c0-optimists, whose beliefs for country
c0 are one standard deviation above the mean and whose beliefs for all other countries are equal
to the mean. The bottom table illustrates the consumption risks in the US for moderates and
US-optimists (see Figure 1 for a detailed explanation).
8.2 E¤ect of belief disagreements on consumption risks
Suppose there are belief disagreements parameterized by v = 0:02. Recall that v = 
(c)
v(c)
is
the cross sectional standard deviation of beliefs for the mean of the income shock relative to the
standard deviation of the same shock. Note also that v provides a measure of disagreements
that is independent of linear transformations of the income shock. Thus, v is the same as
 on the growth rate of per-capita income.11 Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001) estimate the
standard deviation of the growth rate of yearly per-capita income (before nancial innovation)
as 2:46%. Hence, assuming v = 0:02 implies a cross-sectional standard deviation of beliefs for
the same variable given by 0:0492%. Thus, this assumption is satised when two randomly
chosen individualsbeliefs for the growth rate of per-capita income of a G7 country di¤er by
about 0:05%. Belief disagreements at this order of magnitude do not seem unreasonable. I next
show that this level of belief disagreements is su¢ cient to overturn the risk sharing implications
of Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001). I then turn to a more systematic calibration of v.
To illustrate the e¤ect of belief disagreements, I start by considering the portfolio allocations
11More specically, note that the growth rate of income per-capita in year t can be written as
g p er-cap ita incom et 1;t (c) =
yt (c)  yt 1 (c)
yt 1 (c)
=
t 1 (c)
yt 1 (c)
+
1
yt 1 (c)
vt (c) ,
which is a linear transformation of vt (c).
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for a couple individuals whose beliefs are specied exactly and who are representative of a
larger class of individuals with similar beliefs. Let a moderate be someone whose belief for
the income shocks of all countries is the same as the mean belief. In contrast, dene a c0-
optimist as someone whose belief for the income shock of country c0 is exactly one standard
deviation above the mean belief, and whose belief for all other income shocks is equal to the
mean belief. The top table of Figure 3 shows the portfolio allocations for moderates and c0-
optimists when there are two new assets. A moderate holds exactly the risk sharing portfolio
in her respective country, which is illustrated in the third and the fourth columns. Thus,
her portfolio is una¤ected by the presence of belief disagreements. In contrast, a c0-optimist
who lives in country c combines the risk sharing portfolio for country c with her speculative
portfolio, which is illustrated in the last two columns. Note that, for a US-optimists and
a Japan-optimist, the speculative portfolio is comparable in magnitude to (and often larger
than) the risk sharing portfolios. Consequently, the complete portfolio of a US-optimist or a
Japan-optimist is signicantly inuenced by the speculation motive for trade.
The bottom table in Figure 3 shows the consumption risks for moderates and US-optimists
who live in the US. Moderates continue to diversify their risks in this case, as illustrated by the
second column. However, the third column illustrates that a US-optimist does not diversify her
risks. The risk sharing considerations would require this individual to take a short position in
the rst asset. However, her optimism about the US induces her to take a long position. When
there are two assets, the two forces almost perfectly balance for this individual (cf. the top
table), who remains exposed to the US income shock (cf. the bottom table). The last column
illustrates the case with complete markets, in which case the speculation motive for trade
dominates for a US-optimist. In this case, this individual has a greater exposure to the US
income shock, and consequently greater consumption risks, than before nancial innovation.
This analysis illustrates that, with belief disagreements, nancial innovation has a di¤er-
ent qualitative e¤ect on the income risks of moderates and optimists. Guided by the earlier
analysis, I assess the overall e¤ect by considering
p

, which provides a quadratic average of
the standard deviation of consumption over individuals in G7 countries. The left table in Fig-
ure 4 shows that nancial innovation increases this average for each country,
p

c. The right
panel of Figure 4 plots the overall average standard deviation of consumption growth,
p

=y.
In contrast with the case without belief disagreements (the dashed line), nancial innovation
increases
p

=y (the solid line).12
8.2.1 The intuition for the quantitative results
As illustrated by Figure 4, the main result of this section is equivalent to saying that the
decrease in the uninsurable portfolio risks,
p

R (;)  
R (J)=y, is quantitatively smaller than
12 In fact, an even smaller level of belief disagreements, v = 0:015, is su¢ cient to o¤set completely the e¤ect
of two new assets on the overall average,
p

. A greater level, e.g., v = 0:02, is su¢ cient to o¤set the e¤ect
separately for each country average,
p

c.
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Figure 4: The left table illustrates the e¤ect of nancial innovation on consumption risks in
di¤erent countries, for the case with belief disagreements parameterized by v = 0:02. The
right table plots the average standard deviation of consumption growth,
p

=y, as a function
of the number of new assets.
the increase in the speculative portfolio risks,
p

S (J)  
S (;)=y =
p

S (J)=y. To under-
stand this result, it is useful to analyze the determinants of each term in turn.
Note that the reduction in the uninsurable portfolio risks,
p

R (;)  
R (J)=y, is the same
as the reduction in portfolio risks,
p

 (;)  
 (J)=y, in the benchmark case without belief
disagreements. From Figure 2, the standard deviation of consumption growth,
p

 (J)=y,
decreases from 2:46% to 2:21% for the case with two assets, and to 2:13% for the complete
markets case. This implies a reduction in the uninsurable portfolio risks given by:p

R (;)  
R (J)
y
=
(
1:08%, with two assets,
1:24%, with complete markets,
(30)
which is small in magnitude. Intuitively, the income risks in developed countries are small
relative to their average incomes. Moreover, income risks are correlated across developed
countries. Thus, even if these risks are perfectly diversied, the reduction in the standard
deviation of consumption growth, 2:46% to 2:13%, is small in magnitude. Consequently, the
reduction in the uninsurable portfolio risks,
p

R(;) 
R(J)
y , is also small.
In view of Eq. (30), the main result of this section holds as long as the increase in speculative
portfolio risks,
p

S (J)=y, is greater than 1:24%. To understand when this is the case, recall
from Eqs. (22)  (23) that the speculative portfolio risks of an individual i can be written in
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terms of her speculative Sharpe ratio:
Si =
1
relative
p
~i
 1~i =
1
relative
SharpeSi . (31)
Here, recall that SharpeSi is the Sharpe ratio that trader i would perceive in a hypothetical
scenario in which there are no background risks. In this scenario, a textbook result of mean-
variance analysis applies and characterizes the standard deviation of the speculative portfolio
as in (31). Recall also that the term,
p

S (J)=y, is a (quadratic) average of the expression in
(31) over all individuals. Thus, given relative = 3 and the threshold 1:24%, it su¢ ces to have
that individualsspeculative Sharpe ratios on averageexceed 3:72%.
Sharpe ratios at this order of magnitude do not seem unreasonable. To see this, it is useful
to characterize the Sharpe ratio for a particular individual, the US-optimist. To this end, rst
consider a benchmark case in which there is only one asset whose payo¤ is equal to vUS . In
this case, the Sharpe ratio of a US-optimist has a simple expression:
SharpeSi =
~
v(US)
US-optimist
v(US)
=
(US)
v(US)
= v.
Here, the rst equality uses Eq. (31), the second equality uses the denition of a US-optimist,
and the last equality uses the denition of v. Intuitively, the expected excess payo¤ perceived
by the US-optimist is equal to one cross-sectional standard deviation, (US), while the risk of
the payo¤ is equal to the standard deviation, v(US). Thus, the Sharpe ratio, 
(US)
v(US)
, in this
case is exactly equal to the parameter, v = 2%. For the assets proposed by Athanasoulis and
Shiller (2001), the Sharpe ratio of a US-optimist is even greater than in this benchmark, as
illustrated by the following table:
SharpeSi for a US-optimist
Benchmark case with single asset that pays vUS v = 2%
Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001) assets, jJ j = 1 2:71%
Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001) assets, jJ j = 2 2:84%
Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001) assets, jJ j = 7 3:80%
.
Intuitively, the rst asset, the US-Japan swap, not only enables the US-optimist to bet on her
belief, but it also provides an endogenous hedge since the income shocks of the US and Japan
are positively correlated. In view of the hedge-more/bet-more e¤ect, the Sharpe ratio of the
speculative portfolio in this case exceeds the benchmark case, as illustrated by the above table.
Increasing the number of assets provides the US-optimist with increasingly higher speculative
Sharpe ratios. With complete markets, the US-optimist is able to obtain a Sharpe ratio
of 3:80%. This is greater than 3:72%, which is the threshold required for speculative risks
to dominate the reduction in uninsurable risks (on average). This observation provides an
intuition for the earlier result illustrated in Figure 3: For a US-optimist living in the US,
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complete markets generate higher consumption risks than before nancial innovation.
The speculative Sharpe ratio exceeds the required threshold, 3:72%, not just for the US-
optimist but also many other similarly optimistic (or pessimistic) individuals: Individuals
whose beliefs for the US income shock are more than one standard deviation above mean,
individuals who are su¢ ciently pessimistic about the US income shock, individuals who are
su¢ ciently optimistic or pessimistic about other countriesincome shocks, and so on. Conse-
quently, v = 2% is su¢ cient to ensure that the speculative Sharpe ratios exceed 3:72% on
average. This in turn provides the intuition for why the increase in speculative portfolio risks,p

S (J)=y, dominate the reduction in the uninsurable portfolio risks,
p

R(;) 
R(J)
y .
8.2.2 Calibrating the level of belief disagreements
How reasonable is it to assume v = 2%? For a systematic calibration of v, I consider the
Philadelphia Feds Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) on macroeconomic forecasts in
the US. This survey provides (among other things) quarterly data for forecastersbeliefs about
the growth rate of the US gross domestic product (GDP) in the subsequent one year period,
gGDPt 1;t (US), where t   1 denotes the forecast date. To use this data, suppose the population
growth between t 1 and t is a constant that is known at date t 1.13 With this assumption, v
can be calibrated by using data on beliefs about the growth rate of GDP (as opposed to GDP
per capita). The SPF data shows that the cross-sectional interquartile range of forecasts of
gGDPt 1;t (US) is on average given by 0:70% between the rst quarter of 1992 and the third quarter
of 2011. This implies a cross-sectional standard deviation of beliefs for the mean of gGDPt 1;t (US)
given by 0:70%1:35 = 0:52% (under a Normality assumption for beliefs). Over the same period, the
historical standard deviation of gGDPt 1;t (US) is given by 2:08%. Thus, the belief disagreements
between professional forecasters imply:
v =
0:52%
2:08%
= 0:25:
In particular, the implied v is an order of magnitude larger than the required level, 2%.
A caveat is order at this point. Note that the traders in the model agree to disagree about
their beliefs since belief di¤erences are modeled with heterogeneous priors. Thus, the v that
is relevant for the model concerns tradersbeliefs after they learn about the beliefs of all other
traders. However, the v calibrated from the SPF does not necessarily correspond to this
measure. The forecastersbeliefs arguably reect a combination of forecastersinterpretation
of publicly available data as well as their private information. The disagreements based on
interpretation are similar to having di¤erent priors, but disagreements based on private in-
formation are not. To the extent that the disagreements are driven by private information,
13This assumption is reasonable in this context because the growth rate of population is much less volatile
than the growth rate of GDP. The yearly population growth rate of the US between 1992 and 2009 averaged
1.05% with a standard deviation of 0.14% (cf. Penn World Tables). In contrast, the yearly growth rate of GDP
between 1992 and 2011 averaged 2.58% with a standard deviation of 2.08% (cf. NIPA tables).
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the forecasters would update their beliefs after learning about the forecasts of others. For
example, a forecaster with an extremely optimistic belief might revise her forecast downward
after learning about the forecasts of others. If this is the case, then the measure of belief
disagreements calibrated from the SPF overestimates the true v. While it is di¢ cult to adjust
v for forecastersprivate information, the fact that the unadjusted v is an order of magnitude
larger than necessary suggests that the results would continue to hold for reasonable amounts
of private information.
8.2.3 Calibrating the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
As suggested by the analysis in Section 8.2.1, the calibration for the coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion, relative = 3, plays an important role for the quantitative results. Increasing
the parameter, relative, reduces the speculative risks [cf. Eqs. (18) and (31)], but it does
not a¤ect the uninsurable variance [cf. Eq. (17)]. Intuitively, when individuals are more risk
averse, they speculate less but they continue to share their income risks. For an extreme case,
suppose relative = 50 which is the level of the relative risk aversion parameter that is necessary
to rationalize the equity premium puzzle in a CRRA environment, but which is also considered
to be implausibly high (Campbell, 2000). In this case, if belief disagreements are calibrated
to be as high as implied by the SPF data, v = 0:25, then the average standard deviation of
consumption growth,
p

=y remains roughly unchanged for two assets and it increases for a
greater number of assets, illustrating the robustness of the results.
8.3 E¤ect of belief disagreements on endogenous nancial innovation
The analysis so far took the assets in Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001) as exogenous. However,
as emphasized in Section 6, belief disagreements also inuence the asset design. The left table
of Figure 5 illustrates the rst two assets which a prot seeking market maker would introduce
according to the characterization in Theorem 3. Note that the endogenous asset design with
v = 0:02 (and relative = 3) is very di¤erent than the case without belief disagreements.
Intuitively, the market makers incentives are driven not only by individuals surplus from
risk sharing but also from their (perceived) surplus from speculation. Moreover, v = 0:02
is su¢ cient to ensure that the speculation force dominates. More specically, increasing v
further leaves the optimal asset design in Figure 5 qualitatively unchanged.
The endogenous asset design in this case is determined mainly by the nature of individuals
belief disagreements. To keep the analysis simple, I have assumed that an individuals beliefs
for di¤erent countries are independent and that the level of disagreements on each country is
the same, i.e., v (c) = v for all c. These assumptions about the nature of belief disagreements
are admittedly arbitrary. Nonetheless, it is a useful exercise to think about what they imply for
the endogenous asset design. Figure 5 illustrates that the most important two assets in this case
also resemble income swaps, albeit di¤erent ones than the case without belief disagreements.
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Figure 5: The left table illustrates the optimal asset design without belief disagreements (plan-
ner columns) and with belief disagreements parameterized by v = 0:02 (market column). The
right table plots for each of these cases the average standard deviation of consumption growth,p

=y, as a function of the number of new assets.
In particular, the market maker prefers to introduce the US-Canada swap and the UK-France
swap.
To see the intuition behind these innovations, consider the rst swap between the US and
Canada. Among the G7 countries, the US and Canada have the highest correlation of income
shocks according to the Athanasoulis and Shillers (2001) estimates. A swap between these
countries is attractive to speculators because it endogenously provides a hedge for their bets.
For example, consider the US-optimist who is optimistic about the US income shock but who
has the mean belief for the income shock of Canada. By investing in the US-Canada swap,
this individual is able to take a relatively pure bet on her optimistic view about the US. When
she is able to take purer bets, she also takes larger bets in view of the hedge-more/bet-more
e¤ect. This in turn implies larger prots for the market maker who intermediates these trades,
inducing it to innovate the US-Canada swap rst. Similarly, the second introduced swap is
between France and the UK, whose income shocks are the second most correlated among the
G7 countries according to the Athanasoulis and Shillers (2001) estimates.
Recall that, without belief disagreements, the optimal assets are swaps between large coun-
tries or regions whose income shocks are the least correlated (e.g., Japan and the US). In
contrast, the optimal assets in this section are swaps between countries whose income shocks
are the most correlated. While this result is driven by somewhat arbitrary assumptions about
the nature of belief disagreements, it illustrates how belief disagreements could fundamentally
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change the nature of nancial innovation.
Finally, consider the e¤ect of the endogeneity of nancial innovation on consumption risks.
The right panel of Figure 5 plots the average consumption variance as a function of new assets
when the asset design is endogenous. Note that new assets lead to a greater consumption
variance in this case compared to the earlier case in which assets are exogenously set as those
considered by Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001). Intuitively, the fact that new assets are directed
towards maximizing the opportunities for speculation provides an additional force that tends
to increase risks. When this force is present, nancial innovation has a greater quantitative
impact on portfolio and consumption risks.
9 Conclusion
This paper theoretically analyzed the e¤ect of nancial innovation on portfolio risks in a stan-
dard mean-variance setting in which both the speculation and risk sharing forces are present.
In this framework, I have dened the average variance of traders net worths as a natural
measure of portfolio risks. I have also decomposed the average variance into two compo-
nents: the uninsurable variance, dened as the variance that would obtain if there were no
belief disagreements, and the speculative variance, dened as the residual amount of variance
that results from speculative trades based on belief disagreements. My main result character-
ized the e¤ect of nancial innovation on both components of the average variance. Financial
innovation always reduces the uninsurable variance through the traditional channels of diver-
sication and the e¢ cient transfer of risks. However, nancial innovation also always increases
the speculative variance, through two distinct economic channels. First, new assets generate
new disagreements. Second, new assets amplify tradersspeculation on existing disagreements.
The second channel stems from an important economic force, the hedge-more/bet-more e¤ect:
Traders use new assets to hedge their bets on existing assets (i.e., to take purer bets), which
enables them to take larger bets. In view of this e¤ect (and the second channel), my main
result shows that new assets increase the speculative variance even if traders completely agree
about their payo¤s.
I have also analyzed endogenous nancial innovation by considering a prot seeking market
maker who introduces the new assets for which it subsequently serves as the intermediary. The
market makers prots are proportional to traders perceived surplus from trading the new
assets. Consequently, tradersspeculative motive for trade as well as their risk sharing motive
for trade creates innovation incentives for the market maker. In particular, the endogenous set
of assets depends on the size and the nature of belief disagreements, in addition to the risk
sharing possibilities emphasized by the previous literature.
A natural question is how large belief disagreements should be to make these results prac-
tically relevant. I considered a calibration of the model in the context of the national income
markets for G7 countries analyzed by Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001). For reasonable levels
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of belief disagreements, the assets proposed by Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001) would increase
the consumption risks of individuals in G7 countries. This is because income risks constitute
a relatively small fraction of income in G7 countries. Moreover, income risks are correlated
across the G7 countries. Hence, even if these risks were perfectly diversied, the reduction in
the standard deviation of consumption is a relatively small fraction of income. In contrast, for
reasonable levels of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and belief disagreements, individuals
are willing to bet a larger fraction of their incomes in their pursuit of speculative gains. I have
also shown that the endogenous asset design is typically very di¤erent than in Athanasoulis
and Shiller (2001) because new assets are directed towards increasing the opportunities for
speculation rather than risk sharing.
A number of avenues for future research are opened by this paper. The rst open question
concerns the policy implications of the results. This paper characterized the positive e¤ects of
belief disagreements on portfolio risks and nancial innovation, but it has been quiet about the
normative aspects. This is because the equilibrium in this paper is Pareto e¢ cient despite the
fact that trade in new securities may increase the average variance of tradersnet worths. In
view of belief disagreements, each trader perceives a large expected payo¤ from her speculative
portfolio that justies the additional risks that she is taking. Despite the Pareto e¢ ciency of
equilibrium, it is important to analyze policy implications for at least two reasons. First, while
this paper illustrates the results in a standard mean-variance framework without externalities,
the main mechanisms apply also in richer environments that may feature externalities. For
example, if the traders are nancial intermediaries that do not fully internalize the social
costs of their losses (or bankruptcies), then an increase in speculation may lead to a Pareto
ine¢ ciency. I develop a model along these lines in a companion paper. Second, the notion of
Pareto e¢ ciency with heterogeneous priors is somewhat unsatisfactory. This is because while
all traders perceive a large expected return, at most one of these expectations can be correct.14
The analysis of the appropriate welfare notion in these settings is a fascinating topic which I
leave for future work.
A second avenue of new research concerns the evolution of belief disagreements. This paper
analyzed nancial innovation in a model in which tradersbeliefs are exogenously xed. In a
companion paper, I consider nancial innovation in a model in which tradersbeliefs evolve over
time. The novel feature of this dynamic setting is that traders learn from past observations of
asset payo¤s. Under appropriate assumptions, tradersbelief disagreements on a given set of
new assets disappear in the long run. Thus, in these environments, there is a tension between
the short run and the long run e¤ects of new assets on portfolio risks. The resolution of this
tension has important implications for the optimal regulation of nancial innovation, which I
leave for future research.
14This point was also noted by Stiglitz (1989), who wrote: there are real di¢ culties in interpreting the
welfare losses associated with impeding trades based on incorrect expectations.
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A Appendix: Omitted Proofs and Derivations
A.1 Omitted proofs for Section 3
Proof of Lemma 1. Recall that the objective function for Problem (16) is given by

 =
1
jIj
X
i2I
i

 
W0i
vWi + x
0
ixi + 2x
0
ii

. (A.1)
The rst order conditions are given by:
xi + i = 

i
for each i 2 I,
where  2RjJE j is a vector of Lagrange multipliers. Note that xRi =   1~i satises these
rst order conditions for the Lagrange multiplier  =
 P
i2I i

= jIj. This shows that xRi 	i
is the unique solution to Problem (16).
Proof of Lemma 2. Plugging in xRi =   1~i into the objective function (A:1), the optimal
value, 
R, is given by:
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.
Here, the second line uses the fact that
P
i
~i = 0 to replace ii with its deviation from
average, i
~i

. This completes the derivation of Eq. (17).
To derive Eq. (18), rst consider the expression jIj


  1jIj
P
i
i

W0i
vWi

. Using the
denition of the average variance in (15), this expression can be written as:
X
i
i

x0ixi + 2
X
i2I
i

x0ii =
X
i2I
i


~i
i
  ~i
0
 1

~i
i
  ~i

+ 2
X
i2I

~i
i
  ~i
0
 1
ii

=
X
i2I
i


~i
i
  ~i
0
 1

~i
i
  ~i

+ 2

~i
i
  ~i
0
 1~i

=
X
i2I
i


~i
i
  ~i
0
 1

~i
i
+ ~i

=
X
i2I
i

~i
i
0
 1
~i
i
 
X
i2I
i

~
0
i
 1~i.
39
Here, the rst line substitutes for the portfolio demands from (12); the second line re-
places ii with its deviation from average,
i~i

(as in the rst part of the proof); and
the next two lines follow by simple algebra. Next, using the fact that the last line equals
jIj


  1jIj
P
i2I
i

W0i
vWi

, the average variance can be written as:

 =
1
jIj
X
i2I
i


W0i
vWi   ~0i 1~i

+
1
jIj
X
i2I
i

~i
i
0
 1
~i
i
:
Using the denition of 
R in (17), it follows that the speculative variance is given by the
expression in (18).
A.2 Omitted proofs for Section 5
Proof of Theorem 1. Part (i). By denition, 
R, is the optimal value of the minimization
problem (16). Financial innovation expands the constraint set of this problem. Thus, it also
decreases the optimal value, proving 
R (JO [ JN )  
R (JO).
Part (ii). The proof is provided in the text. Here, to demonstrate an alternative approach,
I provide a second proof using matrix algebra. First note that the denition of 
S in (18)
implies that

S (J)  
S (JO) = 1jIj
X
i2I
i


~i
i
0
 1
~i
i
  ~i (JO)
i
0
 (JO)
 1 ~i (JO)
i

=
1
jIj
X
i2I
i

~i
i
0 
 1  
"
 (JO)
 1 0
0 0
#!
~i
i
. (A.2)
I next claim that the matrix in the parenthesis,
 1  
"
 (JO)
 1 0
0 0
#
, (A.3)
is positive semidenite. In view of this claim, Eq. (A:2) implies 
S (J)  
S (JO), providing
an alternative proof for this part.
This claim follows from Lemma 5.16 in Horn and Johnson (2007). This lemma con-
siders a positive denite matrix partitioned into submatrices of arbitrary dimension, A ="
A11 A12
AT12 A22
#
. It shows that the matrix A 1 is weakly greater than the matrix
"
(A11)
 1 0
0 0
#
in positive semidenite order. This in turn implies that the matrix, A 1  
"
(A11)
 1 0
0 0
#
, is
positive semidenite. Invoking this lemma for A =  and A11 = (JO) shows that the matrix
in Eq. (A:3) is positive semidenite, completing the alternative proof.
Part (iii). Consider an economy, E (J), with two properties: (i) There is no disagreement
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on existing assets, i.e., ji = 
j
{ for each j 2 JO and i;{ 2 I, and (ii) There is some disagreement
about new assets, i.e., ji 6= j{ for some j 2 JN and i;{ 2 I. Let EK (J) denote the economy
which is identical except that tradersbeliefs for the underlying risks, v, are scaled by the
factor K, that is: vi;K = K
v
i for each i. I claim that there exists K > 0 such that the result
holds for the economy EK (J), that is:

K (JO [ JN ) > 
K (JO) + : (A.4)
To show this claim, rst note that by assumption:
~JOi = 0 and ~
JN
i 6= 0. (A.5)
Here zJ^ denotes the vector

z1; ::; zJ^

and 0 denote the zero vector. Next note that traders
beliefs for asset payo¤s in economy EK (J) are scaled by a factor of K, i.e., i;K = Ki. Using
(A:5) and (18), this implies:

SK (JO) = K
2
S (JO) = 0 and 
SK (J) = K
2
S (J) > 0.
These expressions further imply:
lim
K!1

SK (J)  
SK (JO) =1.
Finally, note from Eq. (17) that K does not a¤ect the uninsurable variance 
R. In particular:

RK (JO)  
RK (J) = 
R (JO)  
R (J) .
Using the last two displayed equations, it follows that there exists a su¢ ciently large K > 0
such that the inequality in (A:4) holds, proving the claim.
A.3 Omitted proofs for Section 6
Derivation of the Market Makers Prot. First note that trader is payo¤ from rejecting
the market makers o¤er is the certainty equivalent payo¤ from her endowment:
e+W0i
v
i  
i
2
W0i
vWi. (A.6)
Next consider trader is certainty equivalent payo¤ after trading the assets. Using Eq. (12),
tradersnet worth, ni, can be written as:
ni = e  x0ip+

Wi +A
 1

~i (A)
i
  ~i (A)
0
v.
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The certainty equivalent of this expression is given by:
e  x0ip+W0ivi +

~i (A)
i
  ~i (A)
0
 1i (A.7)
 i
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  i

~i (A)
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  ~i (A)

 1i (A) .
Since the xed fee makes the trader indi¤erent, it is equal to the di¤erence of the expression
in (A:7) from the expression in (A:6). That is:
Proof of Theorem 2. To prove the result it is useful to consider the market makers opti-
mization problem in terms of a linear transformation of assets, A^ = (v)1=2A, where (v)1=2
is the unique positive denite square root matrix of v. Note that choosing A^ is equivalent to
choosing A. The normalizations in (25) can be written in terms of A^ as:
A^0A^ = IjJ j, and ~A
j
1  0 for each j. (A.8)
After using the normalization  = IjJ j and substituting A^ for A, the expected prot in (24)
can also be written as:
X
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
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X
i
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
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= tr
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,
where M =

(v) 1=2
~vi
i
  (v)1=2 ~Wi

(v) 1=2
~vi
i
  (v)1=2 ~Wi
0
. (A.9)
Here, the second line uses the matrix identity tr (XY ) = tr (Y X) and the linearity of the trace
operator, and the last line denes the m m matrix, M. Thus, the market makers problem
reduces to choosing A^ =(v)1=2A to maximize (A:9) subject to the normalizations in (A:8).
Next note that the rst normalization in (25) implies:
A^j
0
A^j = 1 for each j. (A.10)
Consider the alternative problem of choosing A^ to maximize the expression in (A:9) subject
to the relaxed constraint in (A:10). The rst order conditions for this problem are given by
MA^ = jA^j for each j,
where j 2 R+ are Lagrange multipliers. From this expression, it follows that
n
A^j
o
j
corre-
spond to eigenvectors of the matrix, M, and

j
	
j
correspond to eigenvalues. Plugging the
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rst order condition into Eq. (A:9), the expected prot can be written as:
X
i
i

A^

=
X
j
j

A^j
0
A^j =
X
j
j .
It follows that the objective value will be maximized if and only if

j
	
j
correspond to the
jJ j largest eigenvalues of the matrix, M. If the jJ j largest eigenvalues are unique, then the
optimum vectors, A^ =
n
A^j
o
j
, are uniquely characterized as the corresponding eigenvectors
which have length 1 [cf. Eq. (A:10)] and which satisfy the sign convention in (A:8). If the jJ j
largest eigenvalues are not unique, then the same argument shows that the vectors,
n
A^j
o
j
,
are uniquely determined up to a choice of these eigenvalues.
Finally, consider the original problem of maximizing the expression in (A:9) subject to the
stronger condition, A^0A^ = I. Since M is a symmetric matrix, its eigenvectors are orthogonal.
This implies that the solution,
n
A^j
o
j
, to the alternative problem is in the constraint set of
the original problem. Since the latter problem has a stronger constraint, it follows that the
solutions to the two problems are the same, completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. Part (i). Note that ~i;0 (A) = A0~
v
i;0 = 0 for any A. This implies
that the expected prot in (24) is given by
P
i
i
2
~i (A)
0
 1~i (A). From Eq. (17), this
expression is equal to c1   c2
R (A) for some constant c1 and positive constant c2. Thus,
maximizing
P
i i (A) is equivalent to minimizing 

R (A). Finally, note from Eq. (18), that

S0 (A) = 0 for any A. This further implies 
 (A) = 

R (A), proving that the market maker
innovates assets that minimize 
 (A).
Part (ii). Consider the following objective function:
1
K2
X
i
i;K (A) , (A.11)
which is just a scaling of the expected prot in (24). In particular, maximizing this expression
is equivalent to maximizing the expected prot. In view of Theorem 2, the optimal asset
design, AK , is uniquely determined. This also implies that AK is a continuous function. Since
AK is bounded [from the normalization (25)], it follows that limK!1AK exists.
Note also that the limit of the objective function in (A:11) can be calculated as:
lim
K!1
1
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i
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0
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~i (A)
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, (A.12)
where the rst line uses ~i;K (A) = K~i (A) and the second line uses ~i (A) = A
0~vi . In
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particular, the objective function remains bounded as K ! 1. Thus, Berges Maximum
Theorem applies and implies that AK is upper hemicontinuous in K over the extended set
R+[f1g. In particular, limK!1AK maximizes the limit objective function in (A:12) subject
to the normalization, (25).
Finally, consider the limit of the average variance
lim
K!1

K

A^

K2
= lim
K!1
0@
SK

A^

K2
+

RK

A^

K2
1A = 1jIjX
i
i

~i (A)
i
0
 1
~i (A)
i
,
where the second equality follows from Eqs. (18) and (17). In view of Eq. (A:12), it follows that
limK!1AK maximizes limK!1 1K2
K

A^

subject to the normalization, (25), completing the
proof.
Part (iii). The assumption that there are two traders with di¤erent beliefs implies that
the optimum value of the problem in (27) is strictly positive. This further implies that
limK!1
K (AK) = 1. By the denition of the limit, there exists K 2 R+ such that

K (AK)  
K (;) +  for each K  K, completing the proof.
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